Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the UN
Geneva

Statement by Pakistan at the Second Meeting of Subsidiary Body 1,
Conference on Disarmament, Geneva
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"Practical measures for nuclear disarmament, including measures to build transparency and confidence and to reduce risks as well as nuclear disarmament verification"

Mr. Coordinator,

Thank you for giving my delegation the floor. We appreciate your able leadership in chairing the meetings of Subsidiary Body 1.

We recognize today's topic is very broad. I would like to briefly address these elements.

In our SB1 meetings so far, we have assessed the security environment and recalled the goals and objectives of disarmament.

The key question now is: how do we move forward, and how can this subsidiary body contribute to practical disarmament measures?

As we highlighted on Tuesday, **this body should develop a roadmap** with **concrete steps for cumulative** and **systematic progress** within the CD. My delegation has already shared elements of such a roadmap in previous meeting, which we believe would also help build confidence and reduce risks. These elements are relevant for consideration under "practical measures".

Mr. Coordinator,

During our first meeting of SB2, we noted the interlinkages between agenda items 1 and 2. The prevention of nuclear war is grounded in two interconnected streams:

1. Nuclear disarmament as the ultimate means to prevent nuclear war.
2. Interim measures to prevent nuclear war until disarmament is achieved (e.g. risk reduction)

SB1 should remain primarily focused on nuclear disarmament, while SB2 can address interim measures that could include for instance risk reduction measures. We will participate actively in those discussions.

However, it is essential risk reduction must not be used as a pretext to evade legal disarmament obligations or delay negotiations on this important subject.

Mr. Coordinator,

Regarding transparency, we agree that increased openness and transparency in principle could enhance confidence, ease tensions, and strengthen regional and international peace and security.

The utility of transparency measures is dependent on the political and security dynamics in a given region and sub-region, as is illustrated by developments in various parts of Asia and Europe today.

We also note that a single, universally applicable framework for transparency in nuclear doctrines does not exist.

Transparency measures also need to be balanced against the need to protect sensitive information that is of military and national security concern.

It is imperative to recognize that an exclusive focus on transparency in nuclear doctrines is insufficient to foster the desired level of trust. In this context, I would like to outline the following considerations:

First, a discussion on nuclear doctrines that does not take into account the existing postures does little to assuage concerns of states.

Second, policy declarations and doctrines are mere expressions of intent, which in turn are not verifiable. It is an established fact that states plan their defence and security on the basis of actual capabilities and force configurations of their adversaries.

Third, nuclear doctrines and arsenals cannot be detached from the larger issue of conventional capabilities, particularly in regions like South Asia with significant asymmetries.

Considering these limitations of an exclusive focus on nuclear doctrines, a more comprehensive approach is required to pursue mitigation of strategic risks. We will present such an approach in the context of discussions in SB2.

Mr. Coordinator,

Now let me briefly turn to nuclear disarmament verification (NDV) – the topic on which we have heard from the distinguished delegations of Brazil and Norway.

We believe verification is not an independent goal—it is a tool within a treaty framework to ensure compliance. Nuclear disarmament verification can be meaningfully pursued in the context of a specific treaty regime, not as an abstract concept or an end in itself.

Verification would be essential for ensuring compliance with any future disarmament agreements.

We recognize the value of conceptual discussions, such as those that took place in the GGEs, which have helped develop a better understanding of the complexities of nuclear disarmament verification.

We are closely examining the proposals of establishment of a GSTE and we note that there are divergent views on it. We will continue to remain engaged on this matter.

Mr. Coordinator

Lastly, before concluding, let me say a few words on the issue of fissile materials since it has been raised by a few delegations.

As we highlighted in our proposed roadmap on Tuesday, a concrete pragmatic step towards disarmament should include elimination of all existing stocks of fissile materials and halting future production through a non-discriminatory Fissile Material Treaty.

A treaty on fissile materials must: prevent vertical and horizontal proliferation; contribute to prevention of a nuclear war; factor in real world developments; contribute meaningfully to the nuclear disarmament regime; and deal with the question of fissile materials in all its aspects and dimensions, including regional and global stability considerations.

Announcement of unilateral moratoria on fissile material production is hardly a virtue and merely an indicator that such states have acquired fissile material far in excess of their legitimate defence needs. Such assertions are neither verifiable nor irreversible.

Thank you.

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