Statement by Pakistan on Thematic Debate on Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
Mr. Chair,
1. We align ourselves with the statement delivered by Indonesia on behalf of the NAM.
2. The Conventions prohibiting Biological and Chemical Weapons have proven to be landmark instruments in terms of their positive impact on the global arms control architecture. For decades, they have helped safeguard our world from the unimaginable devastation and horrors of other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Their contribution lies not only in the destruction and prohibition of physical arsenals but in the cultivation of a global culture against use of such abhorrent weapons.
3. However, the regimes established by these two Conventions are facing challenges as we brace for the coming technological wave. Rapidly evolving landscape of biological and chemical sciences, intertwined with Artificial Intelligence, is giving rise to unprecedented risks. The established norms under the two Conventions are threatened by the potential misuse of these advancements.
4. The real challenge for the Chemical and Biological regimes would be to mitigate these risks while harnessing the peaceful benefits of new technologies without impeding access or raising new barriers for cooperation among States Parties.
5. While the sensitive technologies in both regimes would continue to be regulated to guard against their uses incompatible with the purposes of the BW or CW Conventions, the control measures would need to be commensurate and applied in a non-discriminatory manner.
Mr. Chair,
6. Pakistan remains committed to furthering the objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). We remain firm in our conviction to uphold the OPCW's efficacy and impartiality, particularly in safeguarding its verification mechanism.
7. Pakistan condemns the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, under any circumstances. Those responsible for such acts must be held accountable. OPCW’s role in dealing with cases of chemical weapons use should remain fully compliant with the provisions of CWC. Extending the Secretariat’s remit towards attribution is inconsistent with the technical nature of its work. It is for the States Parties to consider issues of attribution in light of the technical findings of the Secretariat.
8. It was unfortunate that the 5th Review Conference of CWC did not yield consensus. However, we do take solace in the fact that we did not resort to the unwelcome option of voting to force a conclusion upon us. It is important that we revitalize consensus-based outcomes in our work in CWC.
Mr. Chair,
9. The BWC regime remains distinct even after five decades of its inception. While registering progress in strengthening the normative framework against biological weapons, its development of institutional and organizational arrangements has not kept pace with the requirements of this regime.
10. The establishment of a new Working Group in Geneva to strengthen the BWC is in many ways a system reset for the Convention after almost two decades. It offers a unique opportunity to revitalize the Convention, tap its full potential and to contemporize it in ways that it is able to measure up to the promise and perils in the decades ahead.
11. Pakistan is participating actively in the Working Group and has submitted a tangible “Proposal for Cooperation and Assistance Mechanism under Article X” of the BWC.
12. Developing common understandings on the establishment of two mechanisms on international cooperation and assistance as well on review of science and technology during the early stages of our Working Group will help build confidence and trust among the States Parties.
Mr. Chair,
13. We consider the UNSG’s mechanism as an important operational tool for investigating complaints of alleged use after its occurrence. We support regular review of UNSGM guidelines and procedures as provided in its document.
14. We also view the CBMs as a tool for increasing transparency and building trust and confidence among States Parties. However, neither the UNSG’s mechanism nor the CBMs can substitute for assessing compliance by States Parties or the widely supported proposal for concluding a legally-binding Verification Protocol under the BWC. Concluding a Verification Protocol would ensure that biological and toxin weapons are never developed, produced, stockpiled or otherwise acquired or retained, thereby precluding their use by the States Parties.
I thank you.