Statement by Pakistan on Thematic Debate on Outer Space (disarmament aspects)
Mr. Chair,
1. We align ourselves with the statement delivered by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.
2. As our dependence on outer space in our daily lives has increased, so have the threats and likelihood of a conflict in or from outer space. Several delegations, including ours, have been highlighting in this Committee the increasing complexity of such threats.
3. The most visible manifestation of this is the unstoppable arms race, weaponization of outer space, and its increasing characterization as the next warfighting frontier in policies and doctrines of major powers.
4. The mutually reinforcing nature of defensive and offensive capabilities such as the deployment of missile defence systems and their amalgamation with outer space systems is adversely impacting strategic stability at the global and regional levels. Destabilizing capabilities such as Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASAT) and directed energy weapons are being complemented by non-kinetic capabilities. Modern weapons increasingly rely on space-based technologies. There is consequently the risk that warfighting on the ground, at sea and in the air could spill over to outer space—or be triggered by dynamics there.
5. Let us make no mistake. Any conflict, if it erupts in or originates from outer space will not just remain limited to that domain. It will have devastating consequences on our daily lives and its effects will be far and wide across various domains. All states, even those, which may not have any space assets will be affected. Similarly, conflicts taking place on the earth are increasingly likely to be projected in outer space as well.
6. In this backdrop, the urgency of undertaking meaningful actions has never been greater. It is regrettable that there has been no progress under the agenda of Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) for over four decades.
7. At first, the naysayers denied the possibility of an arms race in outer space. Then, they said it was too late to prevent its militarization and called for focus on non-weaponization instead. And it is now being asserted that given its dual-use nature, the only pragmatic way to make progress is to focus efforts exclusively on behaviours while ignoring capabilities. This framing is tenuous at best and at worst risks legitimizing the weaponization of outer space.
Mr. Chair,
8. Space security is currently undergoing a crisis of framing. Some states have started questioning the utility of PAROS – a priority that was established through the SSOD-I. Divisions on how to pursue space security have sharpened as now we see competing processes and divergences in conceptual approaches.
9. Pakistan believes that a comprehensive approach that includes a dual focus on both capabilities and behaviours offers the best pathway for progress, as has been the case in several legally-binding and non-legally binding measures developed throughout the history. We highlighted this position during our participation in the Open Ended Working Group on reducing space threats.
10. Pakistan has consistently advocated for advancing negotiations on a legally binding instrument on PAROS. Concurrently, we have also actively contributed to non-legally binding measures such as Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures (TCBMs). We recognize the complementary relationship between the two approaches. Historically, non-legally binding measures have contributed to the development of legally binding instruments and hold the potential to do so in the future. However, it is crucial to underline that they neither serve as a substitute nor a conditional first step for such binding instruments. Pursuing non-legally binding measures should not divert our attention from legally-binding instruments.
11. It is regrettable that a handful of states continue to block the start of negotiations on legal instruments in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) citing definitional and verification related issues without explaining how such negotiations would affect their security interests. The naysayers have also not explained why definitional and verification issues cannot be taken up during the negotiations.
Mr. Chair,
12. Past has invariably shaped present and future. If history is any guide, technological or military monopolies of the few do not last for too long. Diffusion of technology follows. Other states also acquire capabilities to address asymmetries and threat perceptions. Risks of acquisition by unauthorized actors increase. For these very reasons, it is therefore both urgent and prudent to prevent weaponization of the outer space.
13. A holistic approach to security in outer space remains the most viable option to make progress on Preventing an Arms Race in outer space and to preserve outer space free from conflict for our succeeding generations.
I thank you.