Statement by Pakistan on Thematic Debate on Disarmament Machinery
Mr. Chair,
1. We align ourselves with the statement delivered by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.
2. The stalemate afflicting the multilateral disarmament machinery is both a cause and function of competing strategic priorities, the relentless pursuit of maintaining military advantages and pursuit of discriminatory policies by some states. The messianic zeal, arbitrary prioritization and self-serving notions of ripeness that disregard the foundational arms control principle of equal security for all have reinforced the deadlock in disarmament machinery.
3. Currently, the level of trust and understanding among States to negotiate arms control rules are at even lower than during the Cold War. With conflicts raging in many parts of the world and festering longstanding disputes, the strategic environment has deteriorated further. No wonder, the states are unable to negotiate on matters that directly pertain to their security.
4. Nonetheless, the arms control machinery remains sound in its design, procedures and methods of work. After all, the same machinery was able to conclude several landmark treaties during the cold war when fundamental principles were adhered to.
5. We have seen well-meaning calls for revitalization of the disarmament machinery. What is often presumed in this narrative is the assumption that the working methods constrain development of agreement. This is at best an oversimplification. This belief tends to ignore the fundamental security interests that states are obliged to defend. Changing our working practices will not affect the national security calculus of states based on which they take certain positions. Therefore, trying to find a procedural fix for a substantive security problem will not break this logjam.
6. What is instead required is to undertake a realistic appraisal of security requirements in the face of threat assessments in a given regional and global strategic environment. What is also essential is the recognition of the principle of equal and undiminished security for all States.
7. As the world’s single multilateral disarmament negotiating body, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is an integral and vital part of the UN disarmament machinery. The strength of the CD lies in the fact that all militarily significant states participate in it on an equal footing and are able to protect their vital security interests under the consensus rule. These attributes are indispensable for any forum dealing with disarmament and security issues. Like other bodies, the CD has also been impacted by the dynamics of external environment.
8. Some States continue to oppose commencement of negotiations on nuclear disarmament, placement of weapons in outer space, negative security assurances and even proposals for new treaties simply because they clash with their strategic calculus. On the other hand, some of these very States champion cost free and inherently discriminatory proposals, which they know would naturally be rejected by States whose security such initiatives undermine.
9. The challenges confronting the disarmament machinery are not exclusive to the CD. The First Committee, the Disarmament Commission, and different working groups have been facing similar obstacles.
10. Overcoming this impasse in the multilateral disarmament machinery remains a challenging task. However, seeking pathways outside established forums, especially when pursued on a non-consensus basis and without the participation of all stakeholders, would be even more counterproductive.
11. Pakistan has therefore been calling for reviving arms control consensus, anchored in faithful adherence to and respect of international law, based on non-discrimination and centered on the principles enshrined in the UN Charter and SSOD-1.
12. Revival of consensus on arms control and disarmament could also be done through convening of UNGA Special Session devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-IV). However, simply convening such a forum would not be enough.
13. We must also learn from the lessons of the past. We need to examine why SSOD-II, and III were unable to enjoy same level of success as of SSOD-I. Any partial solutions that only address some of the symptoms and not the causes are unlikely to work.
14. In evolving any new approach, we must start from the same basic premise ie. recognition of the right to equal security for all states – both in conventional and non-conventional fields as well as at regional and international levels.
Thank you.